Al_Dente wrote:Cobra wrote:The info this weekend is a little alarming. Smart Money record short, institutional accumulation distribution divergence persists and both AAII and II are very bullish.
The chart below show Smart Money record short, despite all the problem seems gone: No debt ceiling problem anymore and QE seems forever. Why those guy still want hedge?
“”Smart Money record short””
Cobra: if you were a contrarian, would you surmise that these huge shorts have the potential to produce a monster squeeze?
a couple of ideas. (1) the issue with squeeze is always possible but highly unlikely. the clue is the "smart money". so when looking at futures or options positions it's not only the overt positions but who is holding them and why. the whole large money pros stuff in futures works pretty well--if you can actually see it on a chart. in my experience judging the size of the move is not a great idea--but the direction of the move usually works (usually means about 8.5-9x out of 10 when you can actually see something clearly on the chart). (2) the reasons for hedging (again as a rule not in every case) are not so much the news--but the underlying math. but even more interesting is the idea that tops often happen on good news. so when they sell good news you are really scratching your head because that is a clue. (3) the hedging while more math than anything else is inverse to AAII and II. so the second everyone is gung ho hedgers get cautious. having these charts line up is usually a notable clue.
something to consider is that we are barely holding our own growth wise (i am using emplyoment/gdp and other stuff as a sort of cluster) with the 85 bill a month. everyone is focused on the idea that the money will get pulled at some point--but nobody is thinking "what if it is not enough". so if we have a typical business cycle ether for exogenous or endogenous "reasons" (quotes because everything is linked global to local at this point) then the 85 will not cut it. Some fed and non fed studies showed that we get less than 1% (so say 1/3 of a percent) due to the fed action. while others have speculated that the estimate of 25 billion in costs from gov. closing down with the multiplier effect works to 100 billion negative. now i find it odd that you are seeing 25 billion maybe outdoing 1 trillion in bond buying. but rather than just discard the idea what if there is some general truth to it--and we wind up with (one way or another) spending cuts this coming year about 5 years (so typical old school biz cycle) after the bottom in 2009.
the idea being that doubling fed intervention sometime in the first half of next year would be a problem on a political level. further Yellen is going to really be in a tight spot in terms of preserving fed independence--if anything goes wrong.
in either direction
summing up--the hedging on good news is certainly a clue. the continued idea that just putting out 85 billion in bond buying actually works (as opposed to working as a function of perception rather than underlying math) is really widely held. continued discussion of this 85k being lowered has been wrong for a year. that is a hint too. eg when don't you remove life support on a messed up individual? any normal cycle will render the 85 billion too low. raising it a lot could be a political problem--not raising it could be a political problem. and above all here we are finally seeing the end of a very poor base of economic theory held over the past god knows how many years. as is noted in this greenspan quote from 10-24-13 and the lower quote from wsj story (both lifted from noland's intro this week)
All of us go back for a long way, always understood that there's a lot of irrational exuberance and fear and all of those various aspects of human nature affecting the GDP and the market and everything else. But we all assumed, and in fact it's almost general, that those were random and that they would essentially wash out. And therefore you could set up your econometric models - or any model you want - looking only at the effects of people acting rationally in their long-term self-interest. And that was a general proposition - and that is what they were teaching in the universities. And that's basically what economics was all about going all the way back into the last two centuries ago
he is baffled by all the blame that has been piled on him. Since the recession, critics have said the increased money supply and low interest rates during his tenure at the Fed from 1987 to 2006 led to bubble investments. Mr. Greenspan first heard that theory, he says, in 2007, when John Taylor, a professor of economics at Stanford University who has advised Republicans, made the connection between easy money and the housing bubble. 'It had absolutely nothing to do with the housing bubble,' [Greenspan] says. 'That's ridiculous.'"
the obvious truth is that everyone acts in their perceived self interest--but that is limited by knowledge and timing--it makes sense to get long bubbles and that is not irrational. irrational is holding them after they crack. the hedgers generally are in the first group--and the aaii and ii are generally in the second
have a good weekend